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ACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL CONTRACT OFFER
REQUIRING TIME IN PERFORMANCE
UPPOSE A tells B that the city of Metropole needs a hotel
and that if B will build a hotel there, he will pay him one
thousand dollars. A makes this offer to B because he thinks the
community as a whole will benefit from a new hotel. B starts
building the hotel, but before he has completed it, A revokes his
offer. The question dealt with in this comment is whether a bind-
ing contract exists between A and B so as to make the at-
tempted revocation of the offer a nullity.
Until fifty years ago, it was generally accepted that an offer
could be revoked at will unless it was supported by a seal, con-
sideration, or a collateral contract.' For years the sealed instru-
ment gave the business man a method to escape the defense of
"want of consideration." With this device the needs of business
could be satisfied, and certain offers could be made irrevocable
in a simple way. Legislation, however, has destroyed the effective-
ness of the seal in a majority of the states.2 In these states the
courts have been faced with the problems of whether certain
offers should be considered as irrevocable. It was apparent that
where an offer called for a series of acts, ordinarily involving
considerable trouble and expense, it would be unjust to allow the
offeror to revoke his offer after the offeree had started perform-
ance. However, some courts3 and writers4 refused to depart from
1 McGovney, Irrevocable Oilers, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 644 (1914).
2 47 AM. JUR. 493, Seals, § 8.
3 Although the issue was not clear-cut since there was evidence of bad faith, and
the question of tender, not part performance, was involved, see Petterson v. Pattberg,
248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928). For a discussion of this case see Note, 29 Col. L.
Rev. 199 (1929). See also Biggers v. Owens, 79 Ga. 658, 5 S. E. 193 (1888), and
Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 N. W. 769, 44 L. R. A. 1214 (1912).
For a discussion of the latter case see Recent Cases, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 274 (1913).
4 Wormser,The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 Yale L. J. 136 (1916).
Professor Williston at first seemed to think that the offer could be revoked up until
anytime the act called for had been performed, 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1st ed. 1920)
§§ 60, 60A, but he seems to have been won over to the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
view in his revised edition, 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) §§ 60-60AA.
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the strict principle that an offer calling for an act could be re-
voked at any time before the act called for had been completely
performed. By accepted contract principles this seems to be the
logical view. However, "logic in law must to some extent be tem-
pered by considerations of public policy and justice."'
SURVEY OF DIFFERENT THEORIES6
Generally, the writers and courts defending the doctrine that
where an offer is made calling for an act, the offeror should be
allowed to revoke his offer at any time until the offeree shall have
completed his performance argue: (1) the parties can dictate any
terms they wish; (2) since they have made this type of agreement,
they should be left alone, and it is not the business of the courts
to write in clauses that do not exist; (3) the supposed "hardship"
does not exist in a case of this kind; and (4) a greater hardship
would be created by outside interference from the courts.7 Some
writers admit that there is hardship but argue that courts should
not depart from sound contract principles simply because in cer-
tain cases hardship results.
Although the majority of writers and courts agree that injustices
are perpetrated in some cases, as to the solution there is no agree-
ment. Various solutions have been offered. (1) In a California
case' A promised to pay to B a certain sum upon the completion
of a railway track. B obtained a franchise from the city and com-
menced work on the railway, but he did not start work with the
idea of completing the railway. A notified B that he was not
liable on his agreement for other reasons. Shortly thereafter B
started to work in earnest and completed the railway. The court
said that this was an offer for a unilateral contract, but once B ob-
tained the franchise and started to work, the contract took on a
6 First National Bank v. Ford, 30 Wyo. 110, 216 Pac. 691, 696 (1923)..
o Professor Williston says that the majority of courts in cases of this type have
always held the offeror bound on one theory or another. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev.
ed. 1936) § 60.
1 Wormser, supra note 4.
1 Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire et al., 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086 (1902).
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"bilateral character." Unfortunately, the court did not say what it
meant by "bilateral character." If it meant that once performance
had started, the offer for a unilateral contract was converted into
a bilateral contract, a serious question is raised; for to say that
a unilateral contract can be converted into a bilateral contract by
the commencement of performance is pure fiction.
(2) Most courts strain to allow recovery on a quasi-contractual
basis, and this protects the offeree adequately in some cases. How-
ever, in a suit on a quasi-contract the offeree ordinarily must show
that the offeror has been unjustly enriched because of the offeree's
actions. It is apparent that there are situations where the offeree
has suffered a detriment but the offeror has received no benefit.
For example, A offers to pay B twenty dollars if B will walk
around the Cotton Bowl in Dallas. B gets two-thirds of the way
around, and A revokes his offer. A has received no apparent bene-
fit from B's actions, but B has suffered a detriment. Therefore,
the quasi-contractual theory is a limited one.
(3) A few courts hold that substantial, not strict, performance
of the requested act is all that is necessary.' Such expansion of
the "substantial performance" doctrine, too, is limited in effective-
ness, since in some cases the offeree could have spent a great
amount of money and still have just begun performance.
(4) Professor McGovney suggested that there is an implied
offer to keep the main offer open for a reasonable time; that once
performance has started, the offeree has accepted the collateral
offer; and that, in the event of revocation of the main offer by the
offeror, the offeree has a cause of action on the collateral offer."
This theory reaches the desired results, but it has been criticized
on the grounds that it makes two contracts out of one. It is too
complex and artificial, and a much simpler theory could be
devised.
(5) It has also been suggested that the doctrine of "promis-
9 Elkins v. Board of Commissioners, 86 Kan, 305, ]20 Pac. 542, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.)
662 (1912).
I(0 McGovney, supra note 1.
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sory estoppel"" be applied in cases of this type, since there is
forseeable reliance by the offeree in nearly every case.12 However,
the doctrine of "promissory estoppel" is still in its infant stage,
and it, too, is outside strict contract principles.
(6) Professor Ballantine advanced the theory that once the of-
feree has begun performance, there is a contract although the
offeror does not have to perform until the offeree shall have
completed performance."
(7) The American Law Institute, in the Restatement of Con-
tracts, Section 45, adopted the following rule:
"If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the con-
sideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by the offeree
in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty of
immediate performance of which is conditional on the full con-
sideration being given or tendered within the time stated in the offer,
or, if no time is stated therein, within a reasonable time." 14
One objection to this statement is that the offeree has the power
to bind the offeror while the offeree can withdraw from a bad bar-
gain at any time. 5 It would seem that some theory could be de-
veloped to bind the offeree after the offeree has started perform-
ance. The California case 6 does bind the offeree, but it seems that
the offeree could be bound without the court's indulging in
fictions.
"1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 90.
12 Note, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 366 (1929).
12 Ballantine, Acceptance of Offers for Unilateral Contracts, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 94
(1920).
14 The explanatory notes to this section state that while tender is not the equivalent
of part performance, it is sufficient to make a binding contract. Beginning preparations,
though they are essential to carrying out the contract, do not bind the offeror. This
could in some cases create a great injustice because in some cases the beginning prepa-
rations consume more time and money than the act called for itself. It would seem
that some way should be developed to hold the offeror even during the "beginning
preparations." 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 45.
15 In effect, there is no mutuality of obligation, but the mutuality doctrine has no
application to unilateral contracts because at no time are both parties bound simul-
taneously, N. Y. Law Rev. Comm. Leg. Doc. 65D, p. 55 (1936) ; Ballantine, supra
note 13.
16 Discussed at note 8 supra.
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THE NEW YORK STATUTE
Faced with the abolition of the seal and the case of Petterson v.
Pattberg,7 the New York Legislature decided upon a simple device
of making certain offers irrevocable. The New York statute reads
as follows:
"When hereafter an offer to enter into a contract is made in a writing
signed by the offeror, or by his agent, which states that the offer is irre-
vocable during a period set forth or until a time fixed, the offer shall not
be revocable during such period or until such time because of the
absence of consideration for the assurance of irrevocability. When
such a writing states that the offer is irrevocable but does not state
any period or time of irrevocability, it shall be construed to state
that the offer is irrevocable for a reasonable time."' 8
Since the instant statute covers only written offers expressly
stated to be irrevocable, this adds a new Statute of Frauds with its
inherent difficulties in interpretation. While one must admit this
gives the person who is adequately advised a device to get an
irrevocable offer without consideration, it affords no relief to the
person who gets a parol offer or a written offer that does not state
it is irrevocable. As to the problem of a promise calling for an
act, the New York Law Review Commission considered the prob-
lem but made no specific recommendations before the adoption of
the statute. 19 It would seem that the instant statute was not de-
signed to do away with the rule stated in Section 45 of the Restate-
ment of Contracts but to supplement it because the section was not
designed to do away with consideration but finds consideration
in part performance by the offeree. Therefore, one would imagine
that the rule of Section 45 can be applied in New York. The
statute adds impetus to the recent movement to take some of the
harshness out of the common law doctrine of consideration, but it
IT 248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928).
18N. Y. REAL PROP. LAw, § 279(4), N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33(5) (N. Y. Laws,
1941, c. 328). For comments on the statute see Note, 43 Col. L. Rev. 487 (1943) ; Com-
ment, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 58 (1947).
19 N. Y. Law Rev. Comm. Leg. Doc. 65D, pp. 58-59 (1936).
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also adds to the confusion in the field of unilateral contracts.
Faced with the same problem, an English law review committee
adopted the view set down in the Restatement.0
TEXAS CASES
In most of the Texas cases where the question has arisen, the
offeror has been held bound once performance has been started
by the offeree.21 However, the theory on which he is held is not
always clear. As pointed out earlier,22 it would seem that the doc-
trine of mutuality has no application to unilateral contract cases,
but the Texas courts still talk mutuality of obligation in these
cases. Another difficulty encountered in reading the Texas cases
is the court's use of the word, "unilateral." The term can refer to
either a unilateral contract or a bilateral contract.2" For example,
A contracts to sell B ice next year, and B accepts with the promise
to buy all he needs from A. In a situation such as this the Texas
court might say the offer by A to B was unilateral, apparently
meaning B in no way obligated himself to A. To avoid confusion,
"unilateral" should be confined to unilateral contracts.
The early cases indicated that Texas had adopted the Restate-
ment view. For example, in the case of Edwards v. Roberts24 the
court in speaking of unilateral contracts said, "Such a contract
is not supported by a sufficient consideration, and therefore, un-
less there has been some performance, or other equitable reasons
to prevent, either party may declare the contract null and void,
and it will not thereafter be binding upon him; but when there has
been partial or full performance, such performance operates as
a sufficient consideration, and renders the contract binding upon
the other party."
20 Gt. Brit. Law Rev. Comm. 6th Int. Rep. ff 50(2) (1937).
21 10 TEx. Jun. 171, 172, Contracts, § 100; cases cited in 9 Tex. Dig. 20, 31, Con-
tracts, Key Numbers 10, 19; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, Tex. Ann. (1933) § 45.
22 See text at note 15, supra.
23 Morgan v. Young, 203 S. W. 2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) er. ref. n. r. e.; Big
Four Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Williams, 9 S. W. 2d. 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) er. ref.
24 209 S. W. 247, 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918),rehearing denied, 212 S. W. 673 (1919).
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In Halff Co. v. Waugh" A offered in writing to furnish B with
a truck to use for hauling purposes. All of the gross income above
a certain sum derived from the use of the truck each month was
to be divided equally between A and B. A's part was to be applied
as purchase money from B for the truck. This arrangement was
to go on until the truck was paid for by B. After B had paid
$729.83 to A in this manner, A attempted to repudiate the agree-
ment. In holding A was bound the court said, "It is true that the
contract does not bind the defendant to perform any of its provi-
sions, and that it is for this reason unilateral; but the mere want
of mutuality did not render the contract unenforceable after de-
fendant had accepted the possession of the truck, and in all
things performed his part of the agreement, especially after he
had paid $729.83 in part performance and offered to strictly
carry out its terms until the full purchase price of the truck should
be paid."2
However, not all the cases have followed the rule laid down in
the Restatement of Contracts. In Johnson v. Breckenridge-
Stephens Title Company27 A agreed to let B use his abstract in-
dexes for making abstracts so long as B had need of the indexes.
B was to pay a certain percentage of the profits to A for the use of
the indexes, but B made no return promise to A that he would use
the indexes. B paid out a considerable amount of money in begin-
ning preparations prior to his actual use of the files. A permitted B
to use the indexes for a few months and then terminated the relation-
ship between the parties. A filed suit for the agreed price of the use
of the indexes for the time that they had been used by B. B filed
a cross-action alleging breach of contract by A because of A's fail-
ure to give B access to the indexes. The court distinguished Ed-
wards v. Roberts and held that B had no right to recover on his
cross-action. The court said:
25 183 S. W. 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) er. ref.
261d. at 843.
27 257 S. W. 223 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924), af'g 241 S. W. 195 (Tex. Civ. App.
1922). For a discussion of this case see Recent Cases, 1 Tex. L. Rev. 346 (1923).
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"While from the very nature of a unilateral contract mutuality of
obligation is not essential, such is the case only where some other
consideration for the option passed to the promisor at the time of
making the promise....
"The fact that for about two months the abstract company con-
tinued to permit the use by plaintiffs in error of its indexes and files
did not serve to render valid for any future time a contract originally
not binding for its lack of consideration. '28
Let us analyze the problem presented by the case at bar. It is
clear that there was no bilateral contract involved, and there
should have been no talk of mutuality of obligation by the court.
The first question presented is, "Did the offer here invite a series
of unilateral contracts or one single unilateral contract?" If the
offer invited a series of unilateral contracts, with each use of the
indexes constituting an acceptance by B, then the case would not
be contrary to Section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts. If,
however, the offer was for a single unilateral contract, it seems
clear that the court's decision was contrary to Section 45 of the
Restatement, since the initial use of the files was part perform-
ance and B should have been allowed to use the files for a reason-
able time.
In a recent case" the court, commenting on the problems in-
volved in a sale of land, said, "It is elementary that a naked
agreement by one party to sell land to another in consideration
of a stipulated price to be paid therefor which does not obligate
the other party to pay the price is void for want of mutuality."
This language is too broad, and, finding language of this type in
a case, one wonders just what the rule is today. It seems that there
is a need for legislation or a clear enunciation of the rule by the
courts.30
28 Id. at 225, 227.
29 Stanfield v. Kaufman, 195 S. W. 2d 848, 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) er. rel. n.r.e.
30 For an excellent discussion of unilateral contracts see Hutchison v. Dobson-
Bainbridge Realty Co., 217 S. W. 2d 6 (Tenn. App. 1946).
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A MODEL STATUTE FOR TEXAS
Fully realizing the difficulties inherent in a new statute, the
author of this comment has combined the New York statute and
parts of Section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts to make a single
statute for Texas, as follows:
I
When hereafter an offer to enter into a contract is made and the
ifferor states in writing that the offer is irrevocable during a period
set forth or until a time fixed, the offer shall not be revocable during
such period or until such time because of the absence of considera-
tion for the assurance of irrevocability. When the offer states that
the offer is irrevocable but does not state any period of time of
irrevocability, it shall be construed to state that the offer is irre-
vocable for a reasonable time.
II
If an offer, oral or written, calling for an act is made, whether the
offeror states that the offer is irrevocable or not, and part of the con-
sideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by the offeree
in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract. Once the
offeree enters upon the performance, the obligation is fixed, and the
parties are bound to carry out the contract. While tender is not the
equivalent of performance, it is sufficient to make a contract.
This statute meets the objections leveled against the Restate-
ment rule. It may seem to be a startling proposition that once
peformance has started both parties are bound, but actually there
are dicta in a few Texas cases to support this proposition." The
above statute takes some of the harshness from the Restatement
view and gives the businessman a simple way of making offers
irrevocable for both unilateral and bilateral contracts.32
Charles B. Redman.
31 E.g., Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Smith, 98 Tex. 47, 53, 81 S. W. 22, 24 (1904):
"The authorities go further, and hold that where a particular, definite thing is to
be done by the promisee, and he enters upon the performance, that fixes the obliga-
tions and binds both parties to carry out the contract."
32 While beginning preparations will not suffice to make binding a unilateral con-
tract under Section II of the Model Statute, the businessman has a device to protect
himself during that stage. If he wishes, he can meet the requirements of Section I and
obtain an irrevocable offer.
